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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivations
Legal discontinuities are a major source of international transaction costs (Rodrik, 2004).
If progress toward economic integration is an objective, increasing standardization of
the law is called for. What is the best way to standardize the law? Do we need legal
cooperation or can we rely on a decentralized approach? This paper addresses theses
issues.
Standardization in the legal field aims to render uniform the legal responses to the same
facts or situations, irrespective of the place in which they occur or of the national ele-
ments involved. The result of this evolution is also called legal convergence. There exist
different approaches to achieve it. Some of them are cooperative. In this respect, the
legal literature distinguishes legal harmonization and legal unification (see Boele-Woelki,
2010). Harmonization of law seeks to promote coordination of different legal provisions
or systems by eliminating major differences and creating minimum requirements or stan-
dards (de Cruz, 1999). Unification refers to the substitution of multiple rules by a new
legislation (or the substitution of one legal rule for others). Harmonization is less requiring
that unification and is often used in practice as a step towards it.
Other approaches to achieve convergence are non-cooperative, in the sense that they refer
to unilateral decisions of legal change made at the nation-state level by national regulators
or politicians. These methods can also refer to situations that appear apparently as more
cooperative, but where countries indeed have to act unilaterally. For example, several
nation-states have decided to ratify the United Nations Convention on International Sales
of Good many years after 1980, the year when a diplomatic conference finalized the text
in Vienna. It is clear that nation-states who ratified after 1980 have acted in a non-
cooperative way as they only had to decide to ratify or not an existing text.1.
While cooperative methods should rise the speed of legal convergence, the desirability
of legal harmonization or unification over non cooperative choices is under debate. In
this connection, international legal cooperation has been criticized in several ways. First,
1 For a more general discussion, see Herings and Kanning (2008) who argue that the CISG itself is the result
of a non-cooperative process.
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for several authors centralized cooperative methods, in contrast to legal competition, do
not preserve enough legal diversity (Sokol, 2011). Second, regulations which have been
introduced by harmonization are in many cases more complex and less comprehensive
than the regulations which were previously in force in nation-states (Higgs, 2000). Third,
international agreements about legal rules are more subject to capture by regulators,
bureaucrats, and politicians, than national choices are (Macey and Colombatto, 1996).
Other arguments supporting a skeptical view point of legal cooperation have been devel-
oped in Comparative Law. According to these arguments, legal harmonization and uni-
fication represent threats to the legal culture and the history of nation-states (Legrand,
1996, 1997). Moreover, they could also imply some specific costs of adaptation, which
may make them undesirable. Even law and finance scholars arguing that common law
systems perform better than their civil law counterparts explicitly recognize that it would
be economically impossible for France or Germany to change their legal systems in favor
of common law mechanisms for theses reasons (La Porta et al., 1998).
1.2 Objectives and results
The feasibility and the desirability of coordinated methods of choice are then discussed in
different literatures, but a consensus does not clearly emerge from them. An explanation
for this may be that these literatures lack a common analytical framework. Indeed, they
rely mostly on verbal arguments and do not use an analytical approach, which makes
difficult to compare different modes of legal convergence. In this paper, we propose such a
formal analysis. We compare different methods to achieve legal convergence by analyzing
a model of legal choice derived from Crettez et al. (2013).2 These author study the non
cooperative dynamics of legal convergence, and we use this as a benchmark to analyze
harmonization and unification. We then raise the following question. Does international
legal cooperation always lead to superior outcomes ?
To address this question, the model we consider is a two-country model in which legal
diversity is costly, as are the changes of national laws. Each country must then decide
2Specifically, we suppose that the preferences of law-makers are quadratic or consist in a mix of absolute value
and quadratic. Clearly, our results depends on these specifications. But relying on specifications is instrumental
to have complete comparisons results.
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to adapt or not its legal rules. When countries act non cooperatively, they only take
into account their own interest, avoiding any conflict on objectives. When they act co-
operatively, they must take into account the interest of the other country. We study two
different approaches of legal cooperation. The first approach is harmonization. We model
legal harmonization following Carbonara and Parisi (2007). We assume that countries
choose to maximize the sum of their payoffs, and by doing so bear some specific coordina-
tion costs (in this, we depart from Carbonara and Parisi, ibid). We also assume that the
magnitude of these coordination cost decreases with the legal distance between countries.
The second approach is unification. When countries choose to unify their legal systems,
they cooperatively choose the same set of law (as in Loeper, 2011). This process also
entails coordination costs, but the magnitude of these costs can be different than under
harmonization.
Our approach differ from the literature in several respects. First, we study two possible
modes of legal cooperation in the same framework. With respect to Loeper (2011), this
means that nation-states can choose to harmonize and not only to unify. With respect to
Carbonara and Parisi (2007), nation-states can choose to unify and not only to harmonize.
In addition, endogenous coordination costs are taken into account and the comparison
between the different legal arrangements is made in a dynamic framework, while a common
feature of Carbonara and Parisi (2007) and Loeper (2011) is to use a static model (or
limited to a two periods setting). Adopting a dynamic viewpoint is important to identify
which legal arrangement is better today but also which will be so in the future. As stressed
by Sokol (2011), the way international cooperation occurs often changes over time and
we should explain why. In particular, we show that in some circumstances countries
may never choose to cooperate. This result extends the findings of Crettez et al. (2013)
(and Loeper, 2011) that legal unification may never be preferred to the non-cooperative
process of legal change. Crettez et al. indeed do not consider legal harmonization, nor
do they study the interesting case where preferences of law-makers consist in a mixed
of absolute value and quadratic. Finally, in contrast to Baniak and Grajzl (2010) each
country has perfect information about the preferences of the other states. These authors
find that when countries have imperfect information about the preferences of their allies,
interventionist harmonization is not justified unless there are structural asymmetries in
the patterns of inter-jurisdictional linkages. Our result that non-cooperative strategies
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may dominate legal coordination does not rely on imperfect information.
We use our result to interpret the recent use of more decentralized processes to achieve
legal convergence in the European Union. In this connection, we pay attention to the
proposal by the European Commision of introducing an optional Common European
Sales Law for Europe (see, Ganuza and Gomez, 2013, Gomez and Ganuza, 2012).
We also give some rational to the use, in some circumstances, of legal unification, a
special and extreme form of harmonization, to achieve legal convergence. Indeed, seeking
unification per se can appear as a puzzle at first glance, since unification may formally
always be achieved through maximum harmonization.
1.3 Organization of the paper
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents the basic setup and our model and
the different legal arrangements. Section 3 analyzes the dynamics of legal convergence
under these different arrangements while section 4 compares the utility obtained using
the different modes of legal interactions. Section 5 examines the policy implications that
can be drawn from the model. We discuss the results in section 6. All the proofs are in
the appendices.
2 The Model
We will rely on a version of the dynamic model of Crettez et al. (2013). At each time,
two countries must decide whether or not to adapt their legal systems (we imagine that
there are non-overlapping generations of decision-makers with a decision-making horizon
of one-period ahead of them). We will first present the objective of the countries. Then,
we will discuss the costs associated to each cooperative approache to legal standardization.
Finally we will define the different equilibria associated to these approaches.
2.1 Objectives
We let xit denote the legal system of country i, i = 1, 2, at date t, with x
1
0 6= x20. Legal
convergence occurs when the legal distance | x1t − x2t | decreases.
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We do not specify which parts of the laws become more similar. These parts can refer
to administrative or private laws, and so forth. But the analysis is particularly suited
to contract law, tort law, civil procedure, because legal diversity in these fields is costly
(for instance because it increases the transaction costs for transfrontier trade). According
to Wagner (2002), “there are different types of costs when we face the question of legal
convergence. First, there are the costs for one country to change from period to period its
legal rules and/or institutions. Second, there are the costs for the same country to adapt
its legal system to its international environment. Third, under certain circumstances, the
country has also to support coordination costs, for instance when it decides to cooperate
with another country to harmonize certain legal standards”.3
We incorporate these costs incrementally in the model. To do this we first consider two
instances of the following utility function:4
Ui(xit, xjt , xit−1) = − | xit − xjt |α −
θ
2
(xit − xit−1)2, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (1)
where α ∈ {1, 2} and θ is a positive parameter (the higher θ, the higher the cost borne
from choosing xit different from x
i
t−1).
The first part of the above function represents the utility for country i of choosing legal
system xit when country j chooses legal system x
j
t . The second part represents the utility
of changing legal system to xit when the current one is x
i
t−1. Both parts capture the legal
diversity costs identified by Wagner.5
• The case where α = 1 corresponds to the absolute value-quadratic case in which, for
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j:
U i(xit, xjt , xit−1) = − | xit − xjt | −
θ
2
(xit − xit−1)2. (2)
3On the costs of legal changes, Gomez (2008) notes that legal drafting may be costly because one has to
invest political capital to convince the relevant public of the virtues of the new legislation, and to overcome
opposition from the interest groups who may be harmed by the legal reform, even when overall it enhances
social welfare. Casella (2001) points out the existence of important the lobbying costs. Herings and Kanning
(2008) highlight the costs for lawyers of learning unfamiliar legal solutions.
4The utility function is equal to the opposite of the sum of the costs of legal diversity and legal change.
5Namely, the utility is maximized when country j chooses the legal system of country i because in this case
both the costs of legal diversity and of legal change are nil.
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• The case where α = 2 corresponds to the quadratic case, in which for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j:
Ui(xit, xjt , xit−1) = −
1
2
(
xit − xjt
)2 − θ
2
(
xit − xit−1
)2
. (3)
The difference between the two instances can be explained as follows. When legal distance
is low, the cost of legal diversity in terms of utility is higher with the absolute value-
quadratic specification than with the quadratic one. The opposite occurs when legal
distance is high. Following Wagner (2002), we now consider the coordination costs induced
by legal cooperation.
2.2 Modeling coordination costs
If we consider the interactions between countries at the international level, we observe
a continuum of possible legal arrangements. At one extreme, each country organizes its
legal system in a non cooperative way. At the other extreme, legal choices are collectively
chosen and common rules replace the national ones.
Between the two extremes of non cooperative and fully cooperative legal arrangements,
there are other options that we qualify as “harmonization strategies” (in the terminology
of Boele-Woelki, 2010). Legal harmonization is a less far-reaching process than unification
in the sense that legal differences are less pronounced but are not eliminated. In prac-
tice, there exist several instruments to achieve harmonized and unified processes of legal
changes. In the European Union, legal harmonization relies on model laws, restatements,
principles, rules, and directives.
The distinctions made above raise a puzzle: why do countries choose unification to change
their laws, as it appears as a special and less flexible form of harmonization? A reason that
is worth considering is that coordination on legal changes across nations, especially on the
local applications of commonly chosen principles, may be more difficult to realize and to
monitor than trying to unify in a first place. This is because the number of alternatives
which need to be considered is larger (and the higher the number of nations involved in
the process, the higher the number of alternatives).6 And even if legal unification actually
results from the legal harmonization process, this may take a long time.
6As noted by Goldsmith and Posner (2005), the costs of coordination rise exponentially with the number of
states.
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On the other hand, harmonization often implies agreeing on some general principles only,
whereas unification implies by definition setting a unique rule in all countries. Negotiating
to tailor a unique rule that satisfies all countries may therefore be comparatively more
difficult and lengthy than agreeing on a common set of general principles.
Notwithstanding this last remark, legal unification can dominate legal harmonization
because it may be a sign of political unity, and as such, provides an extra political gain.
Therefore, combining these two arguments, the net cost of unification, that is, legal coor-
dination costs minus the possible extra benefit of fast legal convergence, could be lower
than the coordination costs induced by legal harmonization. This conclusion, in our view,
goes a long way to solve the puzzle of legal unification.
To account for the above discussion in the model, we now assume that countries bear
coordination costs when they cooperate. and that the higher the decrease in the legal
distance, the higher the coordination costs. This assumption captures the idea that to
achieve a sharp reduction in the legal distance, long and costly negotiations are necessary.
We also take into account that coordination costs may depend on the mode of cooperation.
Specifically, we assume that the coordination costs under legal harmonization are given
by the following function Ch(x1t−1, x2t−1, x1t , x2t ) =
ψh
2
(
x1t −x2t −x1t−1 +x2t−1)2. We observe
that when the legal status quo prevails, there are no coordination-costs at all.
Moving to legal unification, we assume that the coordination costs under this legal regime
are given by the function Cu(x1t−1, x2t−1) =
ψu
2 (x
2
t−1−x1t−1)2. Again, when the legal status
quo prevails, there are no coordination-costs.
To take into account the arguments advanced previously that the net coordination costs
under unification may be lower than under legal harmonization, possibly because of an
extra political benefit, we assume that Cu(x1t−1, x2t−1) < Ch(xt, xt, x1t−1, x2t−1) for all xt,
which implies that ψu < ψh.
Having laid out the way we model coordination costs, we can now briefly describe the
three kinds of equilibria considered in this paper.
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2.3 Equilibria
First, we will consider legal harmonization equilibria, which are solutions to the following
problem:
max
x1t ,x
2
t
U1(x1t , x2t , x1t−1) + U2(x2t , x1t , x2t−1)− Ch(x1t , x2t , x1t−1, x2t−1). (4)
In this equilibrium, countries take into account the impact of their choices on the cost
of legal diversity. By definition, legal harmonization does not require legal unification
per se. Moreover, legal harmonization, as we shall see does not necessarily result in legal
uniformity since it may be too costly to change the laws across countries.
Second, we will consider de jure legal unification equilibria, i.e., legal systems xut which
solve the problem:
max
xt
U1(xt, xt, x1t−1) + U2(xt, xt, x2t−1)− Cu(x1t−1, x2t−1), (5)
and which are such that:
U i(xit−1, xjt−1, xit−1) ≤ U i(xt, xt, xit−1)−
Cu(x1t−1, x2t−1)
2
, (6)
with i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, 2}.
The last equation means that legal unification is only chosen if it is better than the status
quo. We notice that when computing the utility of legal unification we have assume that
countries share the coordination costs equally.
Last, we consider the case without cooperation, that is, the non-cooperative equilibria of
the game where each nation-state i adapts its legal system by maximizing U i(xit, xjt , xit−1)
with respect to xit only ((i ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j). In this case, countries do not bear any
coordination costs.
3 Legal Arrangements and Legal Convergence
In this section we now analyze the dynamics of legal convergence both when countries try
to harmonize/unify their laws and when there is no legal coordination. We first study the
quadratic case.
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3.1 Example 1: The quadratic case
We will consider in turn the legal harmonization equilibrium, the legal unification equi-
librium and the non-cooperative equilibrium.
• Legal Harmonization
In this case the objective is written:
−(x1t − x2t )2 −
θ
2
(
x1t − x1t−1)2 −
θ
2
(
x2t − x2t−1)2 −
ψh
2
(
x1t − x2t − x1t−1 + x2t−1)2,
and the legal harmonization equilibrium is given by:
x˜it =
(2 + θ + 2ψh)xit−1 + 2x
j
t−1
4 + θ + 2ψh
, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2. (7)
From this equation, we deduce that:
x˜2t − x˜1t =
(θ + 2ψh)(x2t−1 − x1t−1)
4 + θ + 2ψh
, (8)
from which, we see that legal uniformity is always achieved in the long-run.
• Legal unification7
In a first step, we ignore the coordination costs and we study the following problem:
max
x
[
−θ
2
(
x− x1t−1
)2 − θ
2
(
x− x2t−1
)2]
.
The optimal value xut of x is then:
xut =
1
2
(
x1t−1 + x
2
t−1
)
.
Taking into account the coordination costs Cu(x2t−1 − x1t−1) = ψ
u
2 (x
2
t−1 − x1t−1)2, we find
that the values of the utilities of both countries are the same and are equal to:
Uut = −
(θ + 2ψu)
8
(
x1t−1 − x2t−1
)2
. (9)
Legal unification is only chosen, however, if it is a better choice than the status quo, where
the utility level of both countries is equal to −(x2t−1 − x1t−1)2/2. We can see that legal
unification is better than the status quo if, and only if ψu < (4− θ)/2.
7The expressions of the legal unification equilibrium have already appeared in Crettez et al. (2013). In their
paper, however, the possibility of the status quo was not considered.
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• Non-cooperative equilibrium8
When the objective function is given by equation (??) the non-cooperative equilibrium at
date t is given by the following expressions:
xit =
1 + θ
2 + θ
xit−1 +
1
2 + θ
xjt−1, i 6= j, i, j = 1, 2. (10)
The dynamics generated by the non-cooperative equilibria may be rewritten as:
xit =
xi0 + x
j
0
2
− ( θ
2 + θ
)t
(xi0 − xj0)
2
. (11)
Legal systems converge towards a long-run level equal to (x10 + x
2
0)/2.
3.2 Example 2: The absolute value-quadratic case
We now consider the alternative utility function where the cost of legal distance is rep-
resented by the absolute value function. Moreover, we assume without loss of generality
that x1t−1 ≤ x2t−2.
• Legal Harmonization
It can be shown that9:
x˜it =

x1t−1+x
2
t−1
2 , if x
2
t−1 − x1t−1 ≤ 4θ+2ψh ,
(−1)1+i2
θ+2ψh
+ xit−1, if x2t−1 − x1t−1 ≥ 4θ+2ψh , i = 1, 2.
(12)
In the last case, we observe that:
x˜2t − x˜1t = x2t−1 − x1t−1 −
4
θ + 2ψh
. (13)
As a consequence, legal uniformity is achieved in a finite time (the legal distance being
decreased by the amount 2
θ+2ψh
at each date as long as it is higher than 4
θ+2ψh
).
• Legal unification
The only difference with the precedent legal arrangement is that we need to study when
the status quo is the best choice. The status quo delivers a utility level equal to − |
8 The expressions of the non-cooperative equilibrium have appeared in Crettez et al. (2013).
9 See appendix A for details.
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x1t−1 − x2t−1 |= x1t−1 − x2t−2 in the mixed absolute value-quadratic case. Therefore, legal
unification is better than the status quo if, and only if :
x2t−1 − x1t−1 ≤
8
θ + 2ψu
.
As in the quadratic case, legal unification is chosen only when the coordination costs are
not too high.
• Non-cooperative equilibrium10
There exist two kinds of equilibria at date t (we assume without loss of generality that
x1t−1 < x2t−1):
• If x2t−1 − x1t−1 < 2θ , there are multiple Nash equilibria satisfying:
−1
θ
+ x2t−1 ≤ x1t = x2t ≤
1
θ
+ x1t−1. (14)
We will choose the case where:
x1t = x
2
t =
x1t−1 + x2t−1
2
. (15)
• If x2t−1 − x1t−1 ≥ 2θ , there is a unique Nash equilibrium where:
x1t =
1
θ
+ x1t−1, (16)
x2t = −
1
θ
+ x2t−1. (17)
The dynamics of legal convergence are as follows.
• If x2t−1 − x1t−1 ≤ 2θ , there is legal uniformity from date t on.
• If not, there is a finite date t′ > t at which legal uniformity is realized from this date
on.
Legal convergence occurs in a finite time. When the distance between legal systems at
date t is relatively large, legal uniformity is not a Nash equilibrium but countries are
converging. The distance reduces over time, and when legal systems are close enough,
legal uniformity may be a best-response for both law-makers.
10This equilibrium is studied in the online companion paper of Crettez et al. (2013). The URL of this
companion paper is http://economix.fr/docs/715/Proofs.pdf.
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4 Choosing Between Legal Arrangements
The comparison analysis will illustrate interesting possibilities of legal standardization.
Both the examined above lead to a specific conclusion. While the quadratic case leads to
clear implications, the absolute value case, which represents different assumptions about
the costs of legal differences, has more mixed conclusions.
4.1 The quadratic case
After a few computations we obtain:
Unct = −
[
θ (1 + θ)
2 (2 + θ)2
] (
x1t−1 − x2t−1
)2
,
Uht = −
[
(θ + 2ψh)
2(4 + θ + 2ψh)
]
(x1t−1 − x2t−1)2,
Uut = −min{
(θ + 4ψu)
(
x1t−1 − x2t−1
)2
8
,
(x1t−1 − x2t−1)2
2
}.
Assume first that ψu = 0. It is easy to show that we always have Uut < Unct . Legal
unification is therefore never preferred to no legal coordination11. This remains a fortiori
true when ψu 6= 0. Eliminating the costs of legal distance never compensates the cost
of adjusting one’s legal system. It is noteworthy that this result does not depend on the
weight given to the cost of changing one’s legal system (i.e., θ).12
The next result follows directly from the comparison of the values of the objectives.
Proposition 1. In the quadratic case, if θ
2
2(4+3θ) < ψ
h then countries always prefer not to
cooperate rather than choosing legal harmonization or legal unification. Therefore, legal
uniformity is achieved in the long-run only through non-coordinated legal changes.
That ψh needs to be high for noncooperation to be better than legal harmonization is not
surprising. Indeed, the higher ψh the higher the harmonization costs ψ
h
2
(
x1t −x2t −x1t−1 +
11This is Proposition 3 of Crettez et al. (2013), which is itself implied by Proposition 3 of Loeper (2008).
However, the proof of Lopeper’s Proposition is also more involved.
12 While legal unification is never preferred to legal non-cooperation, it is interesting to analyze under what
conditions it is preferred to legal harmonization (assuming there is no status quo). Formally, we have: Uh < Uu
whenever (θ+4ψ
u)
8 <
θ+2ψh
2(4+θ+2ψh)
. Thus, the higher ψu the higher must be ψh for legal unification to be preferred
to legal harmonization.
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x2t−1)2. What is interesting is that legal harmonization is not the best choice even when
legal distance is low. Indeed, if there were no coordination costs, noncooperation would
never be a strictly better choice than legal harmonization. This is because with legal har-
monization countries can always choose the decisions of the non-cooperative equilibrium.
When there are coordination costs, and when the legal distance is low, the value of these
costs is negligible, albeit non nil. Though this situation is close to the case where there are
no coordination costs, the gains of cooperation never compensate the coordination costs,
however small there are. Indeed, when the legal distance is low, so are the coordination
gains. And it turns out that the size of these gains is always lower than the coordination
costs.
4.2 The absolute value-quadratic case
Given the assumptions and results presented in section 3.5, we have the following levels
of utility:
Unct =

− θ8(x1t−1 − x2t−1)2, if x2t−1 − x1t−1 ≤ 2θ ,
x1t−1 − x2t−1 + 32θ , if x2t−1 − x1t−1 > 2θ .
(18)
Uht =

− (θ+2ψh)8 (x1t−1 − x2t−1)2, if x2t−1 − x1t−1 ≤ 4θ+2ψh ,
x1t−1 − x2t−1 + 2θ+2ψh , if x2t−1 − x1t−1 ≥ 4θ+2ψh .
(19)
Uut = −min{
(θ + 2ψu)
8
(
x1t−1 − x2t−1
)2
, x2t−1 − x1t−1}. (20)
We will concentrate on the case where: 2θ <
4
θ+2ψh
< 8θ+2ψu .
13 This case only arises when
ψh < θ2 and ψ
u < 3θ2 . Under these peculiar assumptions, noncooperation is always the
best choice, as shown in the following Proposition:
Proposition 2. In the mixed absolute value-quadratic case, when θ6 < ψ
u < ψh < θ2 ,
countries always prefer to act individually and not to cooperate. Moreover, legal uniformity
is achieved in finite time.
More precisely, when the legal distance is low (i.e., when x2t−1 − x1t−1 is lower than θ/2),
it never pays to cooperate. Indeed, all legal arrangements yield legal unification, but
13The last inequality is always satisfied since by assumption ψu < ψh.
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because cooperating is costly it is better not to cooperate. When legal distance is high
enough (i.e., higher than 8/(θ + 2ψu)), all cooperative arrangements are dominated by
noncooperation if θ/6 < ψh. In effect, under this assumption legal harmonization is
dominated by noncooperation because the benefits of legal cooperation are more than
compensated by the costs of cooperation. Moreover, legal unification is never chosen
because the status quo prevails and the later never dominates noncooperation. For legal
distances in the interval [2/θ, 8/(θ + 2ψu)], legal harmonization is always dominated by
either noncooperation or legal unification. Noncooperation is the best choice if θ/6 < ψu,
i.e., if the coordination costs ψ
u
2 (x
2
t−1 − x1t−1)2, again, are high enough.
We have some similarities with the quadratic case. Yet, there are two differences with
respect to this case. First, legal uniformity is achieved in finite time. Second, legal unifi-
cation is not always dominated by legal noncooperation.14 The absolute value-quadractic
case is an interesting example since every solution can be optimal. The best legal arrange-
ment depends on the weight nations put on the costs of legal change, and on the initial
legal differences between nations. Since we are in a dynamic model, the optimal mode of
interaction can evolve over time. Cooperative legal arrangements imply more important
legal changes but also some specific costs. Then, when legal distance is high, cooperative
behavior is interesting. When legal distance is low, countries may prefer not to cooperate
to save on harmonization costs.
5 Policy Implications
We have seen that cooperative legal arrangements are not necessarily the dominant strat-
egy to realize convergence between legal systems. Our examples establish that non-
cooperative approach can dominate cooperative strategies temporarily or even definitively.
The creation of more cooperative frameworks of decisions has essentially an impact on
the speed of convergence, but a faster convergence is not necessarily a “good thing”. The
more brutal form of convergence, which in our model takes the form of an immediate uni-
14 Legal unification is preferred to legal noncooperation when the polynomial P (λ) = −( θ+2ψu8 )λ2 + λ − 32θ
where λ ≡ x2t−1 − x1t−1, take positive values. This happens if, and only if ψu < θ6 . As this polynomial reaches
its maximum at λ = 4θ+2ψu , legal unification may be preferred to legal noncooperation for some initial legal
distance λ = x2t−1 − x1t−1 located in the interval [ 2θ , 8θ+2ψu ].
15
fication of legal systems, is an optimal choice for only in some special cases. To take its
time remains a valuable option for countries, and this could explain why there are some
discontents in political unions when many choices are taken in harmonized or unified
fashion.
Our approach seems particularly interesting to evaluate legal convergence within the Eu-
ropean Union context. During the first decades following the ratification of the European
Treaty in 1958, the directives, as an harmonization mechanism, were so complete and pre-
cise that there were quasi-equivalent to regulation (i.e., a unification process). In practice,
the choice between directives and regulations depended on the fields of law as defined by
the Treaty itself.
In the eighties, significant change occurred in favor of a “minimum” harmonization, i.e., a
move towards a non-cooperative approach on the continuum of international legal strate-
gies. This move corresponds to the “new approach” of directives, which only defines
the “essential requirements” for Member States (see,e.g., the Council Resolution of May
2005). The “new approach” means that although directives will continue to set the basic
requirements, they will be limited to setting the essential, that is ensuring general inter-
ests. The formal introduction of subsidiarity and proportionality into policy-making by
the Maastricht Treaty and later in the Amsterdam Treaty protocol is another evidence of
a less controlled evolution15.
According to our analysis the reduction of the degree of detail and prescriptiveness in the
European legislation is not necessarily an inefficient way to ensure convergence of legal
rules in Member States. This is because minimum harmonization or even noncooperation
can be a dominant strategy. At the same time, however, as the European Commission can
declare when an issue needs a regulation (i.e., legal unification) rather than a directive
(i.e., legal harmonization), the risk of choosing the wrong strategy for legal convergence
still remains.
15The introduction of an optional instrument is yet another evidence of this trend. See the Harmonization
and optional laws item of the next section.
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6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss some assumptions used in our analysis. We will address four
points. The first point relates to the modelization of the costs of legal change. The second
refers to the assumption that internal costs of legal change do not depend on the method
of legal convergence. The third point discusses how our comparison results would change
if countries had an intertemporal criterion. Finally the fourth point considers the case
where legal harmonization is realized by proposing an optional law.
• Absence of endogenous switching costs
Carbonara and Parisi (2007) assume endogenous switching costs. If before cooperating,
countries can increase the size of their legal switching costs, they may shift the burden
of legal adaptation to their partners (by claiming that it would be too costly for them
to adapt). When there are endogenous switching costs two outcomes are possible. First,
legal convergence can be lower with endogenous switching costs than without (even when
countries cooperate on the choice of the legal rules). Second, with endogenous switching
costs, countries can be better if they do not cooperate. This is what Carbonara and
Parisi (2007) call the “paradox of harmonization”. Here, we disregard the possibility for a
country to increase or decrease ex ante the value taken by the functions U i. In our view,
this possibility is perfectly relevant in a static framework, but in a dynamic framework,
with repeated interactions, it is plausible that cooperation would also extend to the choice
of switching costs. This is likely to be the case since some switching costs are of a legal
nature (e.g., the use of national referendums as a barrier to adopt laws decided at an
international level). To simplify the analysis, however, i.e., to keep it one-dimensional,
we leave out the possibility of endogenous switching costs.
• Invariance of internal costs of legal change with respect to the chosen method of legal
convergence
In general, internal costs might not be invariant to the chosen method of legal convergence
(namely, functions U i might depend on whether legal changes occur through cooperative
or non-cooperative methods). For instance, having legal change imposed from outside may
rise nationalistic feelings, increasing the political internal costs of change (the French and
Dutch rejections in 2005 of the so-called Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe
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are instances of this fact). This would make cooperative methods more costly. But
we may also consider that coordination reduces the costs of legal change, for instance
because a country can negotiate to retain rules that are very important for its citizens
(like fundamental principles of law, deeply rooted in the national tradition). Moreover,
changes through international coordination often lower internal political costs. Having to
adopt a rule “because the EC forces us to” sometimes is an argument that cuts through
political resistance to change. Therefore, the relevance of the results of this paper is
limited to the cases where these kind of benefits/costs of international coordination are
limited.
• Comparison of the alternative legal regimes with an intertemporal criterion
An alternative assessment of the different methods to achieve legal convergence can be
made by comparing the sum across times of the values taken by the utility functions. If a
legal arrangement is preferred to another one and achieves legal convergence more quickly,
such regime will remain the best using the intertemporal criterion. The interesting case
arises when the dominated regime achieves convergence earlier than the dominating one.
Then, the dominated regime can be the best according to the intertemporal criterion,
because even if the per-period costs are larger in the transition period, total welfare may
be higher as it eliminates the costs of legal differences earlier. This last property can
be satisfied with legal harmonization since the speed of convergence may be larger in
cooperative regimes. This is not always the case, however, since high coordination costs
can slow legal convergence. For instance in the absolute value-quadratic case the dynamics
of legal distance are given by x2t − x1t = max{x20 − x10 − t2θ , 0} under noncooperation, and
x˜2t−x˜1t = max{x20−x10−t 4θ+2ψh , 0}, under legal harmonization. We see that if coordination
costs are high, if i.e., ψh > θ2 , the speed of convergence is higher with noncooperation
than with legal harmonization.
• Harmonization and optional laws
In the recent period, the European Commission has launched a regulation proposal on a
Common European Sale Law as an optional instrument for European firms and consumers.
This proposal has been studied by Ganuza and Gomez (2013) and Gomez and Ganuza
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(2012).16 Ganuza and Gomez (ibid) consider a model where firms can choose between
different national contract laws and an optional European law. They show that these
firms can use the European contract law only, because this reduces the compliance cost
and the cost of producing under different law requirements. Moreover, the European law
can be better than both laws (i.e., the safety requirement, or the warranty period may be
higher).
The model of the present paper is more in line with the approach of Gomez and Ganuza
(2012), where countries, rather than firms, choose the laws. But in fact, we can consider
that when firms of a given country choose a new law, everything is as if this choice were
made by the lawmakers of this country. Indeed, if in equilibrium the firms of a given
country choose the optional instrument, we can say that when this country accepts the
principle of the optional instrument, this acceptation is equivalent for the country to
choose directly the content of the optional law.17
The main difference, however, between the models of Ganuza and Gomez (2012) and
Ganuza and Gomez (2013) and our’s is that we allow more choices for countries.18 Here,
the relevant choice is not only between the prevailing national laws and the optional
instrument. We add indeed the possibility for countries to change their national laws
in many different ways. In this respect, the case where both countries would choose
an optional law is formally equivalent to a legal unification equilibrium (because there
would be no reason to choose an optional instrument different from this equilibrium–
except, of course, if there were multiple equilibria). In the same perspective, the case
where one country chooses the legal instrument and the other country a different law is
formally equivalent to our harmonization equilibrium. Therefore, our approach can take
into account, at least in a first analysis, the possibility for countries to choose an optional
law.
16Formal analysis of optional law have also been presented in Crettez and Deloche (2006), pages 206-207 and
Carbonara and Parisi (2009).
17Of course, if there are multiple equilibria, this conclusion is less clear-cut.
18Another difference is that the model used by Ganuza and Gomez has attractive micro-foundations.
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7 Conclusion
Since the emergence of the Nation-state, law-making has primarily been a task for na-
tional legislatures and courts. They “make” law for relatively homogeneous societies that
are usually characterized by a common language and culture. As a result of increasing
globalization, this is now rapidly changing. An important problem of law-making in a
globalizing world is how to deal with the diversity national legal cultures.
In this paper, we have studied the dynamics of legal convergence and the comparison be-
tween different instruments of legal convergence based on cooperative or non-cooperatives
strategies.
We have first shown that legal uniformity may be achieved in the long-run through what-
ever the way countries interact. Cooperation is then not a prerequisite to realize legal
convergence.
Second, we have also shown that for many configurations legal convergence is not necessary
the best way to achieve legal standardization. More cooperative arrangements essentially
have an impact on the speed of convergence, but not on the fact that convergence will
occur. A faster convergence, however, is not necessarily a “good thing”, and in many
configurations, there is no interest for countries to boost the process of convergence.
Our model can represent a first step to model the cooperative processes of legal standard-
ization in a dynamic setting. It would be interesting to extend the analysis to the case
where there are more than two countries. On the one hand non coordinated processes
could be more costly, but on the other hand, coordination costs would be also higher. It
would also be interesting to know if a decentralized approach can still be the best choice
to achieve legal convergence. It would also be interesting to consider different ways to
model legal harmonization. A promising approach could be that of Loeper (2012), who,
consider the interplay of local/national discretion with federal/union directives.
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A Study of the harmonization equilibrium in the
mixed absolute-value-quadratic case
One can check that the maximum of:
−2 | x1t − x2t | −
θ
2
(x1t − x1t−1)2 −
θ
2
(x2t − x2t−1)2 −
ψh
2
(
x2t−1 − x1t−1 − x2t + x1t
)2
,
under the constraint x1t ≥ x2t (and x1t−1 ≤ x2t−1) is reached when:
x1t = x
2
t = x =
x1t−1 + x2t−1
2
.
Now, it is also easy to see that the maximum of
−2 | x1t − x2t | −
θ
2
(x1t − x1t−1)2 −
θ
2
(x2t − x2t−1)2 −
ψh
2
(
x2t−1 − x1t−1 − x2t + x1t
)2
,
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under the constraint x2t ≥ x1t is reached at:
x1t = x
2
t = x =
x1t−1 + x2t−1
2
,
when x2t−1 − x1t−1 ≤ 4/(θ + 2ψh), and at:
x1t =
2
θ + 2ψh
+ x1t−1,
x2t = −
2
θ + 2ψh
+ x2t−1.
otherwise. Equation (??) follows then easily.
B Proof of Proposition ??
Proof. Let us define λ ≡ x2t−1 − x1t−1.
Let us first assume that 8θ+2ψu ≤ λ. In that case Unct = −λ + 32θ , Uht = −λ + 2θ+2ψh and
Uut = −λ. Then, the non-cooperative solution is preferred to legal harmonization if, and
only if:
−λ+ 3
2θ
> −λ+ 2
θ + 2ψh
⇐⇒ θ
6
< ψh. (21)
This inequality is true by assumption. The, we readily check that noncooperation is
always chosen.
Next let us assume that λ ∈ [ 4
2+ψh
, 8θ+2ψu ]. Then Unct = −λ+ 32θ , Uht = −λ+ 2(θ+2ψh) and
Uut = − (θ+2ψ
u)
8 λ
2.
Legal unification is preferred to non-cooperation when the polynomial P (λ) = −( θ+2ψu8 )λ2+
λ− 32θ where λ ≡ x2t−1−x1t−1. This polynomial takes positive values if, and only if ψu < θ6 .
By assumption this is impossible. Therefore, legal noncooperation is always preferred to
legal unification. We can readily check that noncooperation is preferred to legal harmo-
nization. We then conclude that noncooperation is always preferred to the other legal
arrangements.
Third, let us assume that λ ∈ [2θ , 4θ+2ψh ]. Then Unct = −λ + 32θ , Uht = −
(θ+2ψh)
8 λ
2 and
Uut = − (θ+2ψ
u)
8 λ
2.
By the same reasoning as in the preceding case, we can show that noncooperation is
preferred to legal unification. Moreover, since legal harmonization is always dominated
by legal unification, again, noncooperation is always chosen.
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Finally, it is easy to see that when λ ≤ 2θ , noncooperation is never dominated by the two
modes of legal cooperation.
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